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We examine the reallocation of profits in the European and US banking sectors in 
the period of 1995 to 2004. Specifically, we ask whether the restructuring of both 
industries has contributed to an efficient reallocation of assets. Using a revised 
decomposition framework, we find that US banks are more flexible in the 
reallocation of profits than their European counterparts. In the US, efficient banks 
that appropriate assets decrease industry profitability, as expected in a market 
characterized by a sufficiently high level of competition. In addition, economies of 
scale are exploited more in the US than in Europe. Regulatory reforms in the EU, in 
particular in response to the current crisis, should therefore foster a more closely 
integrated European market. 
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In consolidating industries, no ﬁrm’s market share is guaranteed. As market con-
centration rises, the market restructures and scarce assets are reallocated between sur-
vivors. This implies that some ﬁrms may come out on top, and - through mergers or
organic growth - capture more market share. Other ﬁrms lose market share and may
eventually leave the market altogether. Yet others may see an opportunity to enter the
consolidating markets. Since the seminal work by Schumpeter (1942), these effects have
been well-documented. 1 Among the key lessons taught to us by this literature, is the
notion that we need to investigate ﬁrm-level dynamics, in order to understand industry
dynamics (Haltiwanger, 1997; Caballero and Engel, 1993b). This view is also incorpo-
rated in the theoretical (selection) models of industry dynamics by Jovanovic (1982),
Hopenhayn (1992), Ericson and Pakes (1995), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Bernard
et al. (2009), and, for ﬁnancial intermediaries, in the work of Cooley and Quadini (2001).
A change in market structure, in particular a rapid consolidation, is often the result of
a shock, possibly involving (de)regulation, technological changes, or both (Rose, 1987;
Stiroh and Strahan, 2003; Walker et al., 2002). The timing and depth of the process de-
pends on the timing and amplitude of the shock, and on the stage of the economic cycle
(Caballero and Engel, 1993a; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002). 2 The reallocation
itself may be smooth and rather instantaneous, but more likely it is costly and abrupt.
Exactly how costly reallocation is depends on the speciﬁcity of the industry’s resources.
As a result, a growing literature has studied possible reasons why resources may be
more speciﬁc in some industries than in other industries (Bertola and Caballero, 1994;
Caballero and Hammour, 1998; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). In addition, there is ample
evidenceininstitutional,legalandotherdifferencesbetweencountries,allofwhichmay
affect the speciﬁcity of resources, and thereby may alter reallocation dynamics (La Porta
et al., 1997a,b, 1998). Thus, the degree of speciﬁcity may change the reallocation dynam-
ics (Haltiwanger, 1997; Caballero and Lyons, 1992; Caballero and Hammour, 1996).
The current ﬁnancial crisis illustrates that speciﬁcity is evident in the banking sector.
For instance, the ﬁre sale spiral we have witnessed shows that assets can be worthless
outside a certain bank. Furthermore, the crisis will most likely lead to more regulation,
which will only increase the speciﬁcity of assets. As a result, measuring reallocation dy-
namics in the banking sector is important for our understanding of the competitiveness
and stability of the ﬁnancial system
This paper, in which we analyze the banking markets of the EU and the US, makes
two contributions to the literature. First, we quantify proﬁt reallocations in both mar-
kets. Speciﬁcally, we measure the change in proﬁtability of banks by means of a decom-
position exercise in order to ﬁnd out whether proﬁt-efﬁcient banks gain market share at
the expense of their less efﬁcient counterparts. Second, we test whether restructuring is
driven by the exploitation of scale economies, using panel VAR estimations.
We ﬁnd large differences in the amount of reallocation that has taken place in both
markets. In the US, much of the total change in industry proﬁtability can be attributed
to reallocation dynamics. However, there is no evidence of proﬁt efﬁciency gains in the
1 For examples applied to the banking industry, see King and Levine (1993); Stiroh and Strahan (2003); Berger
et al. (1999); Baily et al. (1992); Klepper (1996); Wheelock and Wilson (2000).
2 Of course, the cycle itself may change because of the shock and the resulting structural changes.
2restructuring process. Instead, reallocation results in downward pressure on industry
proﬁtability. Apparently, attempts to reach the minimum efﬁcient scale have put strong
negative pressure on industry proﬁtability. In the EU, hardly any reallocation has taken
place and changes in industry proﬁtability cannot be attributed to market dynamics.
For the US, we ﬁnd additional evidence that the restructuring process has contributed
to lower proﬁts while it has been accompanied by lower costs through the successful ex-
ploitation of cost scale economies. For Europe, this evidence is largely absent. We there-
fore conclude that in the US the market has been more ﬂexible in reallocating assets than
in the EU. Regulatory reforms in the EU in response to the crisis, should therefore focus
on a truly integrated European market with sufﬁcient reallocation dynamics providing
welfare gains for European consumers.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the banking sectors in Europe and
the United States. Section 3 presents the methodology and Section 4 introduces the data
and reports the empirical results. Section 5 summarizes the ﬁndings and concludes.
2. Consolidation in banking
The restructuring process of an industry is linked closely to what Schumpeter (1942)
referred to as creative destruction. If the ’invisible hand’ works properly, the ﬁrms with
the lowest average costs survive, while the bad performers will ultimately cease to exist.
On the industry level, this evolution should boost scale economies and foster economic
growth, resulting in a consolidated industry. Although in practice we do observe con-
solidation, within-sector differences can be quite large and persistent over time (Baily
et al., 1992). We can distinguish between two elements that drive consolidation: market-
level developments and ﬁrm-level dynamics, the latter being the subject of research in
this paper. For the former, we can point out four causes of consolidation (Berger et al.,
1999).First,technologicalprogress,e.g.internetbanking,hasincreasedtheoptimalscale
of a bank. Second, improvements in ﬁnancial conditions yielded higher proﬁts, which
freed resources available for takeovers. Third, excess capacity can be put into use for
scale enlargement, reducing existing inefﬁciencies. Finally, to facilitate positive returns
to scale, countries deregulate and loosen geographical and/or product restrictions.
Both in the EU and in the US, banking markets have faced signiﬁcant regulatory
changeswhichwereexpectedtoleadtoarestructuringofthesemarkets. 3 ForUSbanks,
geographical restrictions have been lifted in two steps. The 1982 amendment to the Bank
Holding Company (BHC) Act made it possible for out-of-state BHCs to acquire failed
banks. By that time, nearly half of all 51 states allowed state-wide branching through
mergers and acquisitions (cf. Stiroh and Strahan, 2003, for an overview of the years in
which restrictions were lifted). The second step involved the passing of the Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efﬁciency Act of 1994, allowing nation-wide realloca-
tion by the end of 1995 (Berger et al., 1995, 1999). Most importantly, the starting date of
our sample (1995) allows us to consider the US banking market in full.
3 Deregulation and technological changes have been well documented for the banking industry (Berger et al.,
1999; Perottia and Suarez, 2002; Rose, 1987; Vennet, Vander, 1994; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Frame and
White, 2004).
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Similarly, the European national banking markets have been integrated in the Euro-
pean market for ﬁnancial services as of 1993, with the enactment of the Second Banking
Coordination Directive of 1988. This Directive established the single banking license,
allowing all European banks to set up branches in the entire EU area. Although de jure
a single European market exists, Bos and Schmiedel (2007) ﬁnd that country-speciﬁc
cost and proﬁt frontiers are still suggested by the data. 4 Berger et al. (1999) argue that
institutional and cultural differences still impede cross-border reallocation. Indeed, ﬁg-
ure 1b indicates that cross-border mergers are rare in the European Union, compared to
cross-state mergers and acquisitions in the US. Yet, with cross-border mergers exceed-
ing 50 % towards the end of our sample period and because of the possibilities to open
cross-border branches and subsidiaries, we should look at the European Union as one
market. For the US, the evidence is even stronger.
Both markets have experienced a serious increase in concentration, due to increasing
merger activity, entry and exit over a period of ten years (1995-2004). Figure 1a shows
that the Hirschmann-Herﬁndahl Index (HHI) of both geographical banking sectors has
increased over time, indicating larger and fewer banks (European Central Bank, 2006;
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2007). At the same time, we observe a slower consol-
4 However, they do ﬁnd support in favor convergence to the single European meta-frontier.
4idation pace in Europe. 5 However, if cross-border M&A activity continues in the same
fashion as in 2003 - 2004 (see ﬁgure 1b), the HHI is likely to increase sharply in Europe
as well. Moreover, the restructuring process is not yet ﬁnished. The ﬁnancial crisis that
started in 2007 is likely to lead to a new era of tighter regulation, inevitably leading to
stronger restructuring incentives.
3. Methodology
To analyze the impact of the restructuring process on both absolute performance and
proﬁt efﬁciency of banks, we opt for a revised decomposition model of sector-level prof-
itability. The goal of our decomposition analysis is to explain industry-wide growth by
focusing on ﬁrm-speciﬁc behavior. The decomposition method explicitly accounts for
heterogeneity in ﬁrm performance and may prove particularly insightful in restructur-
ing industries (Foster et al., 2001, 2006). According to Jeon and Miller (2005), "aggregate
industry data hide important ﬁrm- and plant-level dynamics that collectively determine
overall industry dynamics." The advantages of decomposition methods were ﬁrst ac-
knowledged in studies on the manufacturing industries (Dunne et al., 1989, Baily et al.,
1992). In these studies, productivity (total factor, multi-factor or labor productivity) is
the dependent variable. Despite the advantages of the focus on heterogeneity at the
micro level, the banking sector has received comparatively little attention in the decom-
position literature (exceptions include Jeon and Miller, 2005, and Stiroh and Strahan,
2003).











where P denotes performance, qi,t is the market share of ﬁrm i in period t and M the
total number of ﬁrms in a given period. We can dissect M by noting that it consists of
survivors S, which are present in t and t 1, the entering ﬁrms N, present only in period























where the within effect measures how ﬁrm-level changes in the survivor’s proﬁtability
contribute to industry-wide performance growth, subject to macroeconomic conditions,
5 Throughout this paper, we use "Europe" or "EU" to refer to the EU 15, which includes Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
6 The complete derivation of the model is available upon request.
5technological change and regulatory structures (Stiroh and Strahan, 2003).
The remaining terms measure the dynamics between market participants. In a given
period, ﬁrms can increase or decrease in size relative to other ﬁrms, changing the market
share of the surviving ﬁrms. This is the so-called between effect. Furthermore, entry and
exit restructure the market. These phenomena determine the size and sign of the reallo-
cation effect, which is obtained by summing the between, entry and exit effect. This re-
allocation effect will be positive if above-average performing ﬁrms grow in size or enter,
thereby contributing positively to industry-level performance. Alternatively, if below-
average ﬁrms decrease or exit the market, industry-wide proﬁtability will increase as
well. The reallocation effect therefore quantiﬁes the restructuring in both banking sec-
tors. For that reason, it is this reallocation effect that we are interested in. The results for
both the European countries and the United States are presented in the next section.
Knowing the size and sign of the within and reallocation effect gives insight in the
performance dynamics of the market. To evaluate potential efﬁciency gains from the
restructuring process, we need to look at efﬁciency at the ﬁrm level by extending the
dynamic reallocation model. 7 More precisely, we measure each ﬁrm’s optimal proﬁt
P
i,t using a stochastic frontier proﬁt model (for details, see the Appendix, section ??).
A ﬁrm’s proﬁt efﬁciency, PEi,t, is then measured as the ratio of actual proﬁts, Pi,t and
optimal proﬁts. An inefﬁcient ﬁrm has foregone proﬁts (proﬁt slack), PF
i,t. Foregone
proﬁts are equal to the difference between optimal (i.e. fully efﬁcient) proﬁts , P
i,t and
actual proﬁts, Pi,t. For a fully efﬁcient ﬁrm, PEi,t = 1, and foregone proﬁts are equal
to zero. For a fully inefﬁcient ﬁrm, PEi,t = 0, and foregone proﬁts are equal to optimal
proﬁts.
Since proﬁt slack can be written aPF
i,t =
Pi,t







































































































7 Essay 3 of Färe and Grosskopf (2003) contains a much more elaborate discussion of the relationship between
ﬁrm-level efﬁciency and industry efﬁciency.
6Hence, we have obtained two components for every term in equation (2). To simplify
thediscussion,wewillagainsumoverthebetween,entryandexiteffecttoobtainanop-
timal and a slack-reducing reallocation effect. Slack-reducing reallocation occurs when
ﬁrms increase their market share and at the same time reduce their proﬁt slack, moving
closer to the common proﬁt frontier. A positive (negative) slack-reducing reallocation
effect means higher (lower) foregone proﬁts, thus contributing negatively (positively)
to total industry proﬁts. If there is positive optimal reallocation, this is reﬂected in an
outward shift of the common proﬁt frontier. One particularly interesting example of
such a shift is the widespread adoption of Internet banking during the time period of
this study. 8
So far, we have argued that reallocation can contribute to industry proﬁtability. What
happens to proﬁt efﬁciency, as measured by the slack-reducing reallocation effect, is
less clear cut. On the one hand, we expect the more proﬁt-efﬁcient banks to survive in
a restructuring environment, in other words a negative slack-reducing reallocation ef-
fect (foregone proﬁts diminish over time). On the other hand, in order for banks to gain
market share, they may have to incur costs, thereby giving up proﬁts and stimulating
restructuring at the same time. Here one can think of costs for attracting new physical or
ﬁnancial capital to serve other geographical or product markets. These costs are likely
to be made before the returns are reaped, lowering current proﬁts. From components
(IV), (VI) and (VIII) in equation (4), this would imply a positive slack-reducing realloca-
tion effect. We want to investigate which effect dominates. Our ﬁrst hypothesis can be
formulated as follows: 9
Hypothesis 1
H1
0 (Expansion costs): The slack-reducing reallocation effect is positive.
H1
a (Selection): The slack-reducing reallocation effect is negative.
Furthermore, we expect more reallocation in the market that is most ﬂexible in reallo-




0 (US>Europe): Long-run slack-reducing reallocation is stronger in the United States.
H2
a (Europe>US): Long-run slack-reducing reallocation is stronger in Europe.
If it is costly to reallocate, in which case hypothesis H1
0 would be favored, it is not
proﬁtable for banks to do so. Whether banks do reallocate depends on the competitive
conditions in the market. We can mimic this situation with the help of impulse response
functions, where we give an upward shock to cost scale economies, resulting in a down-
ward shift in the minimum efﬁcient scale. This could be some exogenous shock to the
sector, for example a new regulatory framework, leading to a larger minimum efﬁcient
scale. The response in the slack-reducing reallocation effect then determines the compet-
8 See DeYoung et al. (2007) for the effect of internet banking on the performance of US banks.
9 Please note that we do not test H0 against Ha, but instead use two one-sided tests on both hypotheses
separately.
7itive conditions in the industry. If banks do not react to this shock in scale economies,
there is likely to be a lack of competition in the market. However, if the market does
respond, by eliminating inefﬁcient ﬁrms, the market is competitive, possibly beyond
some appropriability barrier. Our third and ﬁnal hypothesis is stated as follows:
Hypothesis 3
H3
0 (Competition): A downward shift in the minimum efﬁcient scale stimulates reallocation.
H3
a (Lack of competition): There is no reallocation after a change in scale economies.
Summing up, we have hypothesized the direction, magnitude and effect of realloca-
tion in these restructuring markets by means of three hypotheses. In the next section,
we introduce our data and describe our results
4. Data and results
We use data on independent European and US banks over the period 1995-2004. Eu-
ropean data are taken from Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope database. US data are taken
from the Federal Reserve Call Reports. We only include independent banks, in order to
properly measure reallocation between banks (rather than within banks). 10 The result-
ing data set is unbalanced as, for various reasons, not all banks are covered in the entire
period. Only commercial, cooperative and savings banks are included, as these banks
are more or less homogeneous in terms of ﬁnancing structure.
As a performance indicator, we use banks’ return on assets (ROA). The market shares
are calculated based on total assets. The European banks are pooled together, so that
the market share of each ﬁrm measures its size in the total European banking sector. We
considerthistobethe`fair’comparisonofEuropeanandUSbanks,asboth-inprincipal
- are supposed to operate on markets that are internally open. 11 Outputs, input prices
and the equity ratio are the basis for our estimation of proﬁt efﬁciency, as explained in
the Appendix.
We present our results by ﬁrst discussing the reallocation dynamics and subsequently
analyzing the extent to which these are efﬁciency-driven. To test our hypotheses, we
examine the development of these dynamics in the long run by showing cumulative
effects.
Table 1 contains our decomposition results, based on equation ??. We focus on the
decomposition of changes in industry return on assets into a within and reallocation
effect. The total within effect for the EU is the sum of (I) and (II) in Table 1. The total
reallocation effect is the sum of (III) till (VIII).
In Figure 2a, we plot the cumulative total, within and reallocation effects. From this
ﬁgure we observe that industry ROA (which equals the total effect) develops differently
10 For EU banks, the BankScope independence indicator is used (with a cut-off at independence rating B),
and for US banks an independence variable has been constructed using items RSSD9397, RSSD9001 and
RSSD9365.
11 All analyses in this paper have also been conducted for Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom
separately. Findings as presented here are robust, and these additional results are available upon request.
8Table 1
Decomposition results (based on equation (4))
year region DPt (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
1996 EU 0.012 0.044 0.034 0.003 0.001 -0.006 -0.005 0.001 0.002
1997 EU 0.034 0.137 0.139 0.040 0.022 0.001 0.003 -0.023 -0.005
1998 EU 0.088 0.264 0.203 0.012 0.002 0.126 0.129 -0.085 -0.065
1999 EU 0.160 0.426 0.314 0.054 0.034 0.125 0.113 -0.148 -0.133
2000 EU 0.218 0.711 0.543 0.063 0.040 0.073 0.068 -0.183 -0.160
2001 EU 0.068 0.200 0.143 0.070 0.041 -0.153 -0.110 -0.221 -0.195
2002 EU -0.023 -0.209 -0.155 0.176 0.116 -0.231 -0.174 -0.215 -0.188
2003 EU 0.026 0.003 0.021 0.175 0.114 -0.211 -0.162 -0.244 -0.213
2004 EU 0.118 0.198 0.152 0.256 0.172 -0.210 -0.162 -0.296 -0.261
1996 US 0.041 0.231 0.171 0.064 0.065 -0.032 -0.013 -0.357 -0.357
1997 US 0.018 0.317 0.238 0.069 0.077 -0.093 -0.037 -0.673 -0.670
1998 US 0.013 0.185 0.101 0.050 0.060 -0.111 -0.028 -0.964 -0.942
1999 US -0.087 0.009 -0.059 0.038 0.053 -0.343 -0.187 -1.281 -1.263
2000 US -0.184 0.284 0.122 -0.680 -0.517 -0.428 -0.230 -1.488 -1.472
2001 US -0.168 0.428 0.246 -0.810 -0.613 -0.575 -0.421 -1.543 -1.543
2002 US 0.028 1.723 1.299 -0.722 -0.537 -0.654 -0.467 -1.526 -1.550
2003 US 0.141 2.251 1.719 -0.696 -0.509 -0.689 -0.490 -1.646 -1.651
2004 US 0.211 2.557 1.948 -0.793 -0.592 -0.842 -0.601 -1.896 -1.852
Cumulative results. Columns refer to equation (4).
in Europe and the US. After the process of deregulation, the US banking industry expe-
riences a drop in ROA, followed by a gradual increase. At the end of our sample period,
the US banking industry is shown to have experienced (cumulatively) a small increase
in ROA. European banks on the other hand, experience an increase in ROA, followed
by a slight drop.
Themostinterestingaspect,however,fromFigure2aistheimportanceofreallocation.
In Europe, the within effect dominates throughout. Put differently, the increase in ROA
is shared by almost all banks in the banking system, and there is hardly any reallocation.
In the US, on the other hand, the within effect is strongly positive, but counterbalanced
by a sharply negative reallocation effect. Put differently, US banks as such became more
proﬁtable over our sample period, but highly proﬁtable banks lost market share to other
banks that undercut them and thereby grew at their expense.
To indicate the economic signiﬁcance of these results, we note that, for the period as a
whole, ROA has increased by 11.8 percentage points in Europe, and by 21.1 percentage
points in the US. In the EU, 7.2 percentage points of this increase result from reallocation
of assets, while the restructuring process alone has decreased ROA in the US by almost
40 percentage points. This amounts to a cumulative gain in the level of proﬁts (on the
market level) of approximately $49 billion in Europe, and a loss of roughly $145 billion
in proﬁts in the US, due just to the restructuring of the industry.
Hypothesis 1: the slack-reducing reallocation effect is positive
In order to test our ﬁrst hypothesis, we start by graphically examining the trends
in reallocation in both markets. From ﬁgure 2b, we see that efﬁciency-driven (slack-
reducing) reallocation is positive in both the EU and the US. Furthermore, from section
3, we know that this positive effect implies a negative impact on proﬁtability. Recall that
these are cumulative, or long-run, effects. Apparently, proﬁt-efﬁcient banks are losing
market share to relatively inefﬁcient competitors.
9Subsequently, we test the ﬁrst hypothesis, by performing one-sided t-tests whether
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc cumulative slack-reducing reallocation is larger than zero. Table 2 re-
ports the p-values from these tests on (H1
0) and as well as on the alternative hypothesis
(H1
a). We ﬁnd that H1
0 is always (except the ﬁnal year) rejected for the US. In the EU, H1
a
can never be rejected, but a positive reallocation effect can only be concluded for ﬁve
years, at the 10% level. For both area’s, especially in the US, this is evidence in favor of
the expansion costs explanation: banks have to incur costs in order to expand, while the
beneﬁts are collected later; the restructuring process destroys banks’ proﬁts. A selection
effect, in the sense that the best-performing banks survive and the worst performers are
driven out of the market, is not supported.
Table 2
Tests of hypotheses 1 and 2









1996 0.625 0.375 2604 0.000 1.000 2422 0.000 1.000 0.000
1997 0.142 0.858 2597 0.000 1.000 2145 0.000 1.000 0.000
1998 0.035 0.965 2488 0.000 1.000 1857 0.000 1.000 0.000
1999 0.004 0.996 2321 0.000 1.000 1605 0.000 1.000 0.000
2000 0.012 0.988 2152 0.000 1.000 1423 0.000 1.000 0.000
2001 0.065 0.935 1986 0.000 1.000 1277 0.001 0.999 0.000
2002 0.285 0.715 1836 0.003 0.997 1142 0.001 0.999 0.000
2003 0.152 0.848 1694 0.010 0.990 1045 0.003 0.997 0.000
2004 0.028 0.972 1580 0.011 0.989 950 0.005 0.995 0.000
Reported are p-values from t-tests, based on ﬁrm-speciﬁc observations; H1
0 (H1
a) are p-
values for a test whether the cumulative slack-reducing reallocation is >0 (<0). H2
0 (H2
a)
are p-values for a test whether the cumulative slack-reducing reallocation is larger in the
United States (Europe). For Hypothesis 2, we also report the p-value from a non-parametric
Kruskal-Wallis (KW) equality-of-populations rank test.
Hypothesis 2: The long-run slack-reducing reallocation effect is stronger in the United States
From ﬁgure 2b, we ﬁnd that efﬁcient reallocation has a stronger downward pressing
effect on proﬁts in the US than in the EU. For the full sample period, we ﬁnd a slack-
reducingreallocationeffectof0.271intheEU,and0.659intheUS,obtainedbysumming
columns (IV), (VI) and (VIII) for the year 2004. In words, industry ROA went down by
27.1% (65.9%) in the EU (US) due to efﬁciency losses from restructuring. This difference
is not surprising given the near absence of reallocation in Europe. In the US, relatively
proﬁt-efﬁcient banks have thus lost more market share to proﬁt-inefﬁcient banks. This
suggests that the costs of gaining market share are lower for US banks than for Euro-
pean banks, and that US banks are driven by more competitive forces than their EU
counterparts, conﬁrming hypothesis 2.
Formal tests of the second hypothesis are reported in the last three columns of Table
2. We test our null hypothesis that there is more reallocation in the US than in Europe
using both a independent sample t-test (H2
0) and a Kruskal-Wallis rank tests. A negative
difference (US-EU, column H2
0) is always rejected, hence a positive difference (H2
a) never
is, which is evidence that there are fewer incentives for reallocation in the EU than in
the US; European banks are subject to less competitive forces.
10Figure 2. Efﬁciency and reallocation
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Some further evidence can be found in the last four columns of Table 1. Here, we
speciﬁcally focus on the extent to which entry and exit reduce proﬁt slack. If entry bar-
riers are low enough, a proﬁtable market may attract additional rent-seekers. And with
an enduring lack of competitive forces, entry may contribute positively to the proﬁt-
efﬁciency-driven reallocation. Indeed this is what the results for (VI) (entry) and (VIII)
(exit) demonstrate.
Hypothesis 3: An upward shift in the minimum efﬁcient scale stimulates restructuring
We test hypothesis 3 using a panel-data vector autoregression (VAR) methodology,
following Love and Zicchino (2006). The panel VAR model allows for unobserved indi-
vidual heterogeneity. Country-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects are not included, see p. 195, (Love
and Zicchino, 2006). We estimate
zi,t = G0 + G1zi,t q + fi + et (5)
where zt is a three-variable vector that consists of scale economies, the Lerner index (as
a measure of competition) and either optimal reallocation, or slack-reducing reallocation.
We set the number of lags included, q, at 3. 12 As normal ﬁxed effects are correlated with
the regressors due to the lag structure of the VAR model, we use the Helmert procedure
12 Our results are robust to changing the lag length to 2 or 4.
11(Love and Zicchino, 2006) to apply forward mean-differencing and control for ﬁrm-
speciﬁc ﬁxed effects fi. Equation (5) is estimated by GMM, and Monte Carlo simulations
are used to obtainbootstrapped conﬁdence intervals for the impulseresponse functions.
Testing hypotheses H3
0 and H3
a involves plotting the impulse response of reallocation to
a shock in scale economies.
Table 3
Performance, market power, scale economies
EU US
year ROA Lerner scale PE ROA Lerner scale PE
1995 0.47 0.47 1.08 0.57 0.96 0.18 1.05 0.64
1996 0.47 0.49 1.08 0.60 0.96 0.17 1.04 0.63
1997 0.44 0.51 1.08 0.60 0.86 0.16 1.03 0.64
1998 0.52 0.53 1.08 0.60 0.73 0.15 1.03 0.62
1999 0.47 0.57 1.08 0.59 0.61 0.14 1.02 0.61
2000 0.51 0.56 1.08 0.58 0.66 0.14 1.01 0.60
2001 0.49 0.54 1.08 0.56 0.59 0.14 1.00 0.58
2002 0.46 0.58 1.09 0.54 0.63 0.18 0.99 0.59
2003 0.51 0.62 1.08 0.59 0.65 0.20 0.98 0.61
2004 0.55 0.64 1.09 0.60 0.61 0.21 0.97 0.60
Lerner index is markup, scale economies measured with stochas-
tic cost frontier, PE is proﬁt efﬁciency.
Table3aboveshowsthereturnonassets(ROA),theLernerindex,costscaleeconomies
and proﬁt efﬁciency (PE) in the EU and the US. Cost scale economies increase when
the measure reported here (the elasticity of costs to output) decreases. From the ta-
ble, we observe that the average Lerner index was higher and increasing in the EU.
Scale economies, however, increased in the US, and stayed constant in the EU. Proﬁt-
efﬁciency scores do not differ across the EU and the US.
In Figure 3a, we report the impulse response of optimal reallocation to a one standard
deviation increase in scale economies (i.e. a drop in "scale" as it is reported in Table 3)
in both the EU and the US. Clearly, we observe that a change in scale economies has
no effect on optimal reallocation in the EU. In the US, however, the initial reaction to a
change in scale economies is a drop in optimal reallocation until reallocation increases
andeventuallyresettles.Thisisthetypicalreactioninamarketwhereanupwardshiftin
the minimum efﬁcient scale stimulates restructuring, as ﬁrms ﬁrst restructure internally,
before market shares are reallocated.
For the EU, the situation is similar when we consider the impulse response of slack-
reducing reallocation to the same increase in scale economies in Figure 3b. In the US,
slack reducing reallocation initially increases, indicating that ﬁrms are unable to adjust
and increase efﬁciency in the short run. Over time, however, the most proﬁt-efﬁcient
ﬁrms are the ﬁrst to beneﬁt from the increase in optimum size, causing slack-reducing
reallocation to be negative, which implies a positive proﬁt growth in the market.
Summing up, we ﬁnd that the US banking market is competitive beyond some ap-
propriability barrier. For the EU, we ﬁnd no evidence of any reallocation as a result of
changes in scale economies. Note that this result should not be interpreted as evidence
of real competition in the US market. Yet, it is clearly in favor of the result found in the
literature that he US banking market is more competitive than its European counterpart.
12Figure 3. Response of reallocation to a change in productivity and market power
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5. Conclusion
We contribute to the growing literature on the restructuring of ﬁrm assets by studying
the efﬁciency of the reallocation process that has taken place as banking markets in the
EU and the US went through a signiﬁcant consolidation over the last decade.
We ﬁnd that efﬁcient restructuring occurs in both markets. In the US, restructuring
banks decrease industry proﬁtability, as highly proﬁtable banks lose market share to
other banks that undercut them and grow at their expense. On the other hand, in the
EU reallocation of assets between banks has little effect on industry proﬁtability.
Moreover, whereas we ﬁnd strong evidence that US banks react to a positive shock
to cost scale economies by appropriating the assets of less successful competitors, the
same shock has no effect in the EU.
We therefore conclude that in the US, the banking market has been more ﬂexible in
reallocating assets than in the EU. Additional regulatory reforms in the EU, for example
in response to the current crisis, should therefore foster a truly integrated European
market in which banks compete for market share and excessive rents are dissipated
through reallocation.
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Appendix: Efﬁciency estimation
We employ stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to measure X-efﬁciency relative to cost
and proﬁt frontiers. 13 We follow the alternative proﬁt approach (Humphrey and Pul-
ley, 1997). In brief, banks face perfect input markets, but on the output side they are
allowed limited price discretion as reﬂected by an additional pricing opportunity con-
straint in the maximization problem. We include ﬁrms with negative proﬁt, following
Bos and Koetter (forthcoming). We use a translog functional form including a time trend
variables and write the proﬁt frontier as: 14












aij lnxikt lnxjkt + #k (A.1)
Here x consists of outputs y, input prices w, control variables z and a time trend t. The
composed error #k consists of random noise component, v, and a systematic inefﬁciency
component labeled u. We assume that the random component v is i.i.d. N(0,sv). For the
inefﬁciency part we assume that u is i.i.d. Nj(m,su)j. As proﬁt inefﬁcient banks operate
below the efﬁcient frontier the latter term is added to random deviations, resulting in a
composed error of the form #k = vk   uk. Firm-speciﬁc efﬁciency estimates are derived
as the expected value of inefﬁciency conditional on total error and we can calculate
efﬁciency scores:
PEk = [exp(  ˆ uk)] (A.2)
In estimating equation (A.1), we use European data from BankScope, US data from
the Federal Reserve Call Reports. Proﬁt and outputs are in millions of (PPP) US dollars,
the equity ratio is between 0 and 100%. The total number of observations (banks) is
27456 (4079) for the EU, 17249 (3157) for the US Total number of observations in frontier
estimations or decomposition may very slightly due to some missing observations. All
banks are independent, using Bureau van Dijk independence indicator B and higher
for EU, and the Federal Reserve independence indicator for the US. Detailed estimation
results are available on request. Table 3 in the paper shows the development of the
average PE score over time.
13 We refer to Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for an excellent discussion of the development and application of
SFA to efﬁciency measurement.
14 We use maximum likelihood estimation to obtain both parameter estimates for equation (A.1) and the error
components. We impose homogeneity of degree one in input prices and symmetry.
16